Mind Field

VII. Towards a Theory of Conceptual Evolution

Ideas, obviously, are not static entities; over the centuries, the notions that people have held about the world and the universe have undergone continuous change and revision. If we assume that the evolution of concepts is as much a natural phenomenon as the evolution of species, then it makes sense to assume that the processes underlying it are, at least in theory, knowable.

While I am unable at this time to offer much insight into what exactly these processes might be, I imagine that any workable theory of conceptual evolution would have to include some account, at least, of the ways in which different ideas and systems of ideas influence each other, and the ways in which different groups, made up of people who believe different things about the world, interact. For what they are worth, I offer a few comments on these particular matters below.

A. The influence of ideas upon each other

Strictly speaking, ideas which are held by different individuals do not influence each other directly–ideas influence minds of those that hold them, and people take action partly as a result of this influence; often this action (including the action of speaking or writing words – or thoughts into words) has an effect on the ideas held by others. Sometimes it is more convenient, however, to think of ideas influencing each other in the abstract, without considering the critical role of the individual human mind at every step, in order to make the subject easier to digest. This useful fiction allows one to get acquainted somewhat with the big picture without getting bogged down in too many details all at once.

One shortcut I use to help me make sense out of interactions among ideas and ideologies in the abstract is to classify such interactions into certain categories. This enables me to look for differences and similarities in the patterns of such interactions and to simplify somewhat the complex historical context involved in each particular case. Others might prefer alternate classification schemes or different ways of describing such interactions, but I think that developing some type of categorization can help one in sorting out something useful from the tangled mess of data at one’s disposal.

One category of interaction I often use is what I would call a “syncretistic” type of interaction. The word “syncretism” is commonly defined as the combination of different forms of belief or practice. It is used to describe instances in which ideas belonging to different belief systems are fused or mixed together to form a new framework that contains elements of each. An example of this type of thing is the interaction between Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in the Chinese intellectual tradition. Ideas from each system of thought are brought together into a framework (or a number of them) that seems to fit together in such a way as to avoid major self-contradictions. Another example is the so-called “New Age” religions of our current times, containing elements of Eastern and Western religious thought. There are many other examples that can be fit into this category within the history of religion, philosophy and other disciplines.

Another category of interaction is that in which different concepts or sets of concepts offer competing and often mutually exclusive explanations for some aspect of reality. Representative examples can be found throughout the Greek tradition of philosophy, such as the ideas of Plato vs. Aristotle (and their followers) concerning universal Ideas; throughout the history of theology, such as the ideas of Luther and Calvin on salvation vs. the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church; through the post-medieval era, such as the ideas of Descartes vs. Locke regarding innate ideas; and into modern times, such as the ideas of Freud vs. Jung about the nature of the unconscious mind. Rival scientific hypotheses with different explanations for the same or similar sets of data could also be conceived as falling into this category. Further examples could be cited ad nauseam– the list is practically endless.

Frequently, it is useful to consider that some combination of the two types of interaction mentioned above has occurred. The Christian religion, for example, has incorporated into its own doctrine certain elements of ancient Greek philosophical systems with which it has come into contact, while at the same time holding on to ideas which contradict other elements of those same systems; another example is that Marx borrowed from Hegel’s system the idea of the dialectic while arguing that it was, in fact, a materialistic process rather than an idealistic one.

There can be many shades of gray with this type of classification scheme, but I think that using one which might help to simplify things in this way can often do more good than harm, if it is viewed as merely a study aid and nothing more.

B. The clash of cognitive subcultures

The division of people into certain categories based upon their views about things can also be useful at times. When trying to understand the interactions among such groups in the abstract, I find that using the notion of the “cognitive subculture” can help to simplify in my own mind some of the complex interactions among individuals that is actually taking place. These cognitive subcultures can be thought of as being made up of people who subscribe to a particular belief system in existence at a particular moment in time, and the interactions between them can be thought of in a number of different ways.

One of the most simple of these is that which I refer to as the “clash.”

For example, the disappearance of paganism in much of Western Europe in the centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire involved what one could call a clash (or series of clashes) between followers of the various pagan traditions and members of the early Christian church. The interactions between followers of certain Christian “heresies” and those of more “orthodox” beliefs could also be characterized in this way, as could the interactions between various Marxists factions struggling for political supremacy within certain countries during this century. Closer looks would of course reveal many details which would tend to complicate these pictures, but even with all the complications, a common theme can still be made out: that of members of different groups holding to different systems of thought “clashing,” if you will, over what the “truth” is (and what to do about it).

It is true that sometimes interactions between members of discrete cognitive subcultures should be described more as a symbiosis than a clash (and sometimes both at the same time), as with the sometimes cooperative, sometimes confrontational relationship between management and labor at a factory, or with different levels or institutions of the same government. The important thing in each of these cases, I think, is to take note of the differences in outlook and their effect on the differences in policies being pursued, and what results from this, and not to get too wrapped up in the labels one uses. These labels should be seen as shortcuts to make it easier to understand such phenomena; if they become stumbling blocks instead they should be discarded.