Mind Field

V. Ideological Theory of Cognition within a Larger Worldview

If it is true that one’s consciousness or cognition is largely a function of the frameworks of concepts or systems of beliefs that one holds or subscribes to, then how would I describe my own ways of thinking? It would be inconsistent, I believe, to claim that other people’s minds operate in such a way and yet at the same time maintain that my own views are somehow suspended in the ether of objective truth and are beyond that sort of thing. Rather, if my ideas on this subject are correct, then it would follow that my own subjective view of things is also to be defined in such terms, and that my cognitive theory (such as it is) should not be understood in isolation, but as part of a larger view of the world.

The general view of the world that I subscribe to is shared by a number of others who may or may not attach the same label to it, and who may or may not conceive of it as a comprehensive belief system. It is not my aim to speak for them. Instead, I intend to try to convey a basic outline of my own worldview, as I understand it, and how my cognitive theory fits in with it. For those who might agree with my general premises regarding the nature of the universe, and yet disagree with some or all of my conclusions about particular phenomena within it, I would say that we all have to make up our own minds about things, and believe and act in a way that we feel is right.

A. Naturalism as an ideology

The word “naturalism” as defined in the dictionary means the doctrine that scientific laws are adequate to account for all phenomena. This means that naturalists operate under the assumption that everything that exists, both known and unknown, is subject to the laws of nature. It is supposed that, while our knowledge of natural phenomena will continue to increase, mysteries will always remain, and our experience of the universe is now and will remain quite limited.

While naturalism as a doctrine holds that the supernatural does not exist, I believe that a few points of clarification are in order:

First, since it is a philosophy or belief system and not a scientific law or theory in itself, naturalism is subject to different interpretations by different individuals. The interpretation presented here is mine, and while I expect that some of those who would consider themselves naturalists agree with it, I imagine that there are others who would not.

Second, since defining the terms “natural” and “supernatural” can be somewhat tricky and prone to semantic dispute, I will not attempt to do it here. Instead, I will refer the reader to the general consensus of the scholarly community in the physical sciences as to their treatment of the matter. This can be gleaned fairly easily by an examination of a random sample of their practices and literature.

Third, it must be stressed that the assumption that scientific laws are universal and are sufficient to account for everything that exists rests on faith. Even if all observations up to this point are consistent with it, that doesn’t necessarily mean that this will always be true. Apart from this, even now it is hypothetically possible that some supernatural agency exists that is responsible for the order in the universe which seems to prove the existence and universality of natural laws; it might not be possible to disprove the existence of such an agency, especially if it were argued that such a being is omnipotent. The fact that this is recognized as a hypothetical possibility, however, does not mean that naturalism is the same as agnosticism: while the inability to absolutely disprove such a thesis is acknowledged, the faith remains that it is not true. This assumption, in the face of alternative possibilities, that things are as they appear to be, and that natural laws are responsible for the universe being the way it is, is at the heart of the scientific endeavor, and also of naturalism, in my view.

As for the nuts and bolts of the doctrine of naturalism as I understand it, I find that it is expedient to speak of it in terms of the nomenclature of traditional philosophy. This is because the classification scheme devised over the centuries in this field to describe various systems of thought furnishes us with convenient points of reference, and because there is a substantial body of literature that uses it. As I briefly mentioned above (Ch. II., section on “Philosophy”), the main branches of philosophy include logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. Metaphysics can be further divided into ontology and cosmology.

B. Logic, ethics and aesthetics

The “logic” of naturalism can be thought of as being what is commonly called the scientific method (or methods); that is, at the point at which an exposition as to the proper way of reasoning would be expected, I would simply point to the methods and practices of the community of scientists. While not as axiomatically well-grounded as the logic of some of the other existing philosophical systems, it has the advantage of actually working in practice, as shown by the state of modern knowledge. This type of reasoning is always in a state of evolution (or towards a theory of conceptual evolution), and can be thought of as a psycho-socio-cultural phenomenon in itself. For a fuller treatment of it, I would urge the reader to sample some of the literature by philosophers of science, social scientists and historians attempting to describe, analyze and chronicle it.

As for ethics and aesthetics, I personally don’t believe that naturalism prescribes any particular direction in these areas. Instead, I see it as more descriptive in its nature, in that it would take note of ethical or aesthetic modes of thinking, and it would attempt to understand and describe these types of things in terms of natural laws. Questions about how people come to view things as good or bad or beautiful or ugly might fall within this category, as well as questions about the evolution of these notions. Research from existing social science fields might furnish the raw material for the answers to such questions. Naturalist ethics and aesthetics, then, might be considered as the application of psychology, sociology, and anthropology, etc., to the understanding of these particular areas. It should always be borne in mind, however, that an individual naturalist will have his or her own sense of what is right and wrong and his or her own tastes with regard to the arts. It may not be possible to scientifically determine what one “ought” to do or to like, but I think that it has been pretty well established that people–whatever their set of beliefs–DO tend to have some moral code or other and some sense of aesthetic taste.

C. Scientific knowledge as ontology and cosmology

Ontology is the branch of philosophy that deals with the questions of existence itself. Whether or not anything at all exists, and the nature of Being if it does, are within its scope. Ontology also refers to those assumptions about the nature of existence that underlie particular systems of thought; therefore, one can speak about the “ontology” of this or that philosophical system as meaning the principles of that philosophy which deal with such questions.

Naturalism presupposes the existence of real entities which make up the universe. The determination of the characteristics of those entities lies within the purview of the field of physics, primarily, and also of chemistry. The fundamental question of “what is matter?” has still not been answered definitively, but a lot has been discovered about how matter behaves. This type of knowledge constitutes what I would call the “ontology” of naturalism.

Cosmology is the branch of philosophy that attempts to describe the universe as a whole. It also refers to particular descriptions of the universe from the perspective of particular philosophical systems.

The cosmology of naturalism consists of all scientific knowledge about the universe currently accumulated. It would include not only the stricter, scientific definition of “cosmology,” which primarily refers to astronomical phenomena, but also knowledge from such fields as biology, chemistry, physics, geology and all the social sciences (since people and what they do are also part of the universe). The only criterion to be met is that the knowledge must be scientific. Since what comprises scientific knowledge is debatable at times, and since science is usually in a constant state of refinement (or occasionally revolution), I would tend to follow the lead of the general consensus of professional researchers and educators as to what to include and exclude, while reserving judgment and keeping an open mind where such a general consensus is lacking. Of course, it is clear that at times the scientific community is wrong about things, but naturalistic cosmology should not be confused with absolute, eternal, objective truth: it is just the current scientific view of the universe, warts and all.

D. Cognitive theory as epistemology

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy dealing with explanations of knowledge per se and of how people know things.

In the way that the ontology and cosmology of naturalism deal with the same types of issues as ontology and cosmology generally, but from a scientific perspective, so it would seem that naturalistic epistemology should be defined as the scientific approach applied to general epistemological issues. Unlike the case of the state of knowledge of the physical universe that has been acquired through the natural sciences, however, the state of knowledge of the overall workings of the mind and of the nature of knowledge itself is still not at the point of having achieved a general consensus as to basic principles, in my view. While there is much that natural scientists can agree upon regarding the fundamental forces and processes at work in the universe, there is no such agreement among scientists when it comes to the principles governing the operation of the mind as a whole (although there is consensus regarding many aspects of the underlying mechanisms). There are, rather, a number of competing models when it comes to general theories of the mind.

If there doesn’t happen to be any generally accepted scientific theory of the mind, I don’t think we can speak of a naturalist epistemology–at least not in the same way as we can of a naturalist ontology or cosmology. However, I believe that, among the existing academic fields or sub-fields, cognitive theory seems to be the most appropriate one to be able to deal with those types of questions that have traditionally been within the scope of epistemology. For this reason, I would say that cognitive theory (in the abstract) should be considered the best candidate to eventually become identified with a naturalist epistemology; if and when some particular theory of cognition becomes widely accepted within the scientific community, then perhaps we will be able to say more.